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Abstract
In this paper the impact of product market uncertainty on the optimal replacement
timing of a production facility is studied. The existing production facility can be replaced
by a technologically more advanced and thus more cost-effective one. We take into account
strategic interactions among the firms competing in the product market by analyzing the
problem in a duopolistic setting. We calculate the value of each firm and show that i)
a preemptive (simultaneous) replacement occurs when the associated sunk cost is low
(high), ii) despite the preemption effect uncertainty always raises the expected time to
replace, and iii) the relationship between the probability of optimal replacement within
a given time interval and uncertainty is decreasing for long time intervals and humped
for short time intervals. Furthermore it is shown that result ii) carries over to the case
where firms have to decide about starting production rather than about replacing existing
facilities.
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1 Introduction
The present value of growth opportunities often constitutes a significant part of a firm’s
value. Myers (1977) claims that ”the market value of almost all real assets can be partly
attributed to associated call options. That is, the ultimate payoff of almost all assets depends
on the future discretionary investment of the firm”. Fama and French (2001) estimate that
on average 42% of the corporate value in the mid-1990s can be attributed to growth oppor-
tunities. Translated into dollars, this means that the average listed US firm holds a $410
million portfolio of growth options. Consequently, proper management of such a portfolio via
an appropriately designed capital budgeting process becomes crucial for maximizing share-
holder value and satisfying return-on-capital requirements. The recognition of the role of
real options in capital budgeting dates back to Kester (1984), Trigeorgis and Mason (1987),
Trigeorgis (1988), and Dixit and Pindyck (1995). Predictions of the real option theory has
been tested empirically, among others, by Paddock et al. (1988), Quigg (1993), Caballero
and Pindyck (1996), Holland et al. (2000), and Bulan (2001).
The extensive process of deregulation taking place in the last decade, combined
with a wave of mergers and acquisitions, has resulted in an oligopolistic structure of a large
number of sectors. A shift towards such a structure takes place not only in traditional
regulated markets (telecommunications, energy, transportation) but also in more competitive
industries (fast-moving consumer goods, car manufacturing, pharmaceuticals). Consequently,
models designed for optimizing capital budgeting decisions while ignoring competitors may
cease to be valid. Imperfect competition in the firm’s product market requires that strategic
interactions with other firm(s) are taken into account. The gap between capital budgeting
and strategic planning has already been recognized by Myers (1987) and has been confirmed
by Zingales (2000).
Furthermore, the volatile economic environment that firms face these days calls for
an appropriate identification of the sources of uncertainty underlying their real activities.
Therefore, there is considerable scope for a structural modeling of the product market, where
the relationship between the uncertain factor and the cash flow of the firm is explicitly
accounted for.
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Keeping these considerations in mind, in the paper we address a number of issues,
which we relate to the problem of production facility replacement with a more cost-effective
one. The questions we endeavor to answer are the following:
• What is the impact of strategic interactions on optimal capital budgeting strategies?
• How does the demand level that triggers the optimal replacement depend on uncer-
tainty, and on the fact whether the firm is the market leader, has the role of the
1
To our best knowledge, within a dynamic real option model the product market structure in a 2-player
game is explicitly modeled only by Perotti and Rossetto (2000), Pennings (2002), and Boyer et al. (2002).
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follower, or acts identically as its competitor?
• Is the relationship between the uncertainty and the probability of optimal replacement
monotonic?
• How does demand uncertainty affect the optimal threshold corresponding to new market
entry?
We consider a continuous-time model in which the firm makes an investment deci-
sion under product market uncertainty and imperfect competition. The model follows Smets
(1991) and Grenadier (1996) in assuming that i) there are two identical firms competing in
the product market, and ii) the value of the firm depends on the value of a stochastic process
but is otherwise time independent. The payoff functions are derived from the firm’s reaction
curves in the oligopolistic market. Moreover, we calculate the expected replacement timing
and determine the probabilities of making optimal replacement within given time intervals.
Under either perfect competition or a monopolistic market structure, modern theory
of investment under uncertainty predicts that the firm will wait with investing if uncertainty
is higher (cf. McDonald and Siegel, 1986, and Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, Ch. 2). This is due
to the fact that investment is irreversible and the firm has an option to postpone it until some
uncertainty is resolved. However, if (i) more than one firm holds the investment opportunity,
and (ii) the firm’s investment decision directly influences payoffs of its competitor(s), opposite
effects of increasing uncertainty with respect to the investment timing can arise. First,
increasing uncertainty enhances the value of the option to wait. Second, the value of an early
strategic investment (made in order to achieve the first-mover advantage) can significantly
increase as well. Huisman and Kort (1999) consider a continuous-time duopoly model with
profit uncertainty, i.e. where the profit function is subject to multiplicative random shocks
(cf. Smets, 1991, and Grenadier, 1996). They show that the effect of a change in the value
of the option to wait on the optimal investment threshold is always stronger than the impact
of strategic interactions. This implies a negative relationship between uncertainty of the
firm’s profit flow and investment. On the contrary, Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) analyze
product market uncertainty and find that, in some cases, higher uncertainty does stimulate
investment. The authors consider a two-period setting in which (one of the) duopolistic firms
can invest in a cost-reducing technology. Product market uncertainty arises due to random
shifts in the demand curve. These shifts are caused by both changes in consumers’ tastes
and a varying mass of consumers.
2
The resulting payoff function is convex in the stochastic
demand parameter since an increase of demand has a more-than-proportional effect on the
2
Profit uncertainty, such as in Huisman and Kort (1999), and Boyer et al. (2002), is equivalent to demand
driven either by the changes in the mass of consumers or by the changes in consumers’ tastes under zero
marginal cost assumption, respectively. In both cases uncertainty can be expressed as random changes in the
slope of the demand function.
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realized duopolistic profits (firms are responding to higher demand by increasing both output
and price). Using Jensen’s inequality, Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) conclude that higher
volatility of the product market can increase the expected profit, which has a positive effect
on investment.
3
The aim of this paper is to reconcile the contradicting results of the existing con-
tributions and to determine the effects of product market uncertainty on investment in a
fully dynamic, continuous-time framework. This framework embraces both profit convexity,
a feature prevailing in oligopolistic markets, and timing flexibility, inherent to most invest-
ment decisions. We begin the analysis by describing the equilibrium strategies that occur
in the resulting real option game. We show that, contrary to the models based on profit
uncertainty, the type of equilibrium depends on the replacement cost: a unique critical level
of the replacement cost exists that separates the regions of preemptive and simultaneous
equilibria. Consequently, a reduction in the replacement cost can accelerate replacement not
only by lowering the level of demand at which the optimal replacement is made, but also by
resulting in a switch from simultaneous (late replacement) to preemptive equilibrium (early
replacement).
4
Furthermore, we prove that the minimal demand level triggering the invest-
ment increases with uncertainty for both firms. This result holds both for the case in which
the investment is associated with replacing an existing asset and for the case in which the
firms have to decide when to start up production. Subsequently, we show that, in expecta-
tion, product market uncertainty delays investment. We thus can conclude that the result
of Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) does not carry over to a fully dynamic framework. Finally,
we analyze the probability of asset replacement within a given time interval. It turns out
that the replacement probability decreases with uncertainty for time intervals that include
the optimal time to invest in the deterministic case. For shorter intervals there are two op-
posite effects which leads to a humped relationship between uncertainty and the probability
of replacement (cf. Sarkar, 2000).
The model is presented in Section 2, while the value functions and replacement
thresholds are derived in Section 3. Section 4 contains a description of the equilibria and in
Section 5 the effect of uncertainty on replacement thresholds is determined. In Section 6 the
decision to start production in a new market is analyzed. Section 7 examines how uncertainty
influences replacement timing and the probability of investment within a given time interval.
Section 8 concludes.
3
Jensen’s inequality implies here that convexity of a profit function results in the expected profit being
higher than the profit associated with expected demand.
4
This implies that the type of equilibrium can easily be affected by e.g. the authority. The rule imposed
by Germany’s telecom regulator enabling six companies which acquired the third generation mobile-phone
licenses to share the costs of building a new infrastructure, may serve as an example of such an action. See
The Economist, 9th June 2001
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2 Framework of the Model
Consider a risk-neutral firm that has an investment opportunity to replace its existing
production facility with a technologically superior one. The firm operates in a duopoly, in
which the following inverse linear demand function holds:
p (t) = A (t)−Q (t) . (1)
For each t ∈ [0,∞), p (t) is the price of a non-durable good/service offered by the firm and
can be interpreted as the instantaneous cash flow per unit sold, A (t) is a measure of the
size of the demand, and Q (t) is the total amount of the good supplied to the market. Let r
denote the riskless interest rate. Parameter A (t) follows a geometric Brownian motion
dA (t) = αA (t) dt+ σA (t)dw (t) , (2)
where α is the instantaneous drift parameter, σ is the instantaneous standard deviation, dt
is the time increment, and dw (t) is the Wiener increment. The uncertainty in the model is








, where Ω is the state
space, F is the σ-algebra representing measurable events, and P is the actual probability
measure. The filtration is the augmented filtration generated by the Brownian motion and
satisfies the usual conditions.
5
The other firm operating in the market is identical to the first, both are profit-
maximizers and compete in quantities (a` la Cournot).
6,7
The initial constant marginal cost
of supplying a unit of the good is K and implementing the new production facility reduces
this cost from K to k. In order to start using the new facility, Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2}, has to incur




} satisfies the usual conditions if it is right continuous and F
0
contains all the P-null sets
in F (see Karatzas and Shreve, 1991, p. 10).
6
Quantity competition yields the same output as a two-stage game in which the capacities are chosen first
and, subsequently, the firms are competing in prices (see Tirole, 1988, p. 216).
7
Allowing for a certain level of asymmetry between the firms does not change the firms’ strategies nor
influences the direction of the impact of model parameters. The only difference is that the firm having the
relative advantage (e.g. lower marginal cost) is going to realize positive rent in the outcome of the preemption






































Superscript 1 (0) in pi
ij
indicates which firm replaced (did not replace) its production facility,










The profit of the only firm which replaced the production facility is higher than in the profit
of a firm in a situation where two firms made the replacement. In turn, the latter profit
exceeds the profit of symmetric firms operating the existing facility, which is still higher than
the profit of the only firm which did not replace its production asset.
Admittedly, the chosen model formulation is one out of many possibilities. We choose
the linear demand function in order to be able to make comparisons with the results of the
two-period model of Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998). Modeling uncertainty as parallel shifts
in the demand curve allows us to exploit the effects of convexity of profits in the stochastic
demand parameter. Extensions include a more general demand function, a different type of
cost function, and Bertrand competition. This paper can be seen therefore as a first fully
dynamic investigation of the impact of product market uncertainty on investment timing.
We summarize the problem by describing the strategy space of the firms and the
equilibrium concept. Define a simple strategy of Firm i (i ∈ {1, 2}) for a subgame starting at




(t;ω)) : [s,∞)×Ω → [0, 1]× [0, 1]. For every
path ω of the process (2), G
i
(t;ω) is the cumulative probability of Firm i replacing the asset
by time t; p
i
(t;ω) measures the intensity of atoms in the interval [t, t+ dt] (see also Section
4.1) and enables coordination in a situation where replacement is optimal for at least one
firm (cf. Thijssen et al., 2002). For all paths ω ∈ Ω it holds that:
(i) G
i
(t;ω) is non-decreasing and right-continuous with left limits,
(ii) p
i
(t;ω) is right differentiable and right-continuous with left limits,
(iii) if p
i
(t;ω) = 0 and t = inf{u|p
i





We assume that K  A (0), so that the probability weighted discount factor associated with the event
{A (t) < 2K − k} is negligible. Waiving this assumption would not significantly contribute to our results and
would be done at the expense of explicit analytical formulae for the optimal investment thresholds (cf. Dixit
and Pindyck, 1996, p. 191).
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Property (i) ensures that G
i
(·) is a probability distribution. Properties (ii) and (iii) are
for technical convenience and allow for calculating replacement probabilities and for endoge-
nously determining firms’ roles in the limiting case when p
i
(t;ω) = 0.
















To determine the firms’ optimal policies we use the subgame perfect equilibrium concept,
while the firms’ strategies are assumed to satisfy intertemporal consistency and α-consistency
conditions.
9
3 Value Functions and Replacement Thresholds
In this section we establish the value of the firms and their optimal replacement thresh-
olds. There are three possibilities concerning the timing of Firm i’s investment relatively to
the decision of the competitor (Firm j). First, Firm i may invest before Firm j does and,
therefore, become the leader. Alternatively, Firm j may invest sooner and Firm i becomes
the follower. Finally, the firms may invest simultaneously.
The standard approach used to solve dynamic games is to analyze the problem back-
wards in time. Consequently, we begin with the optimal strategy of the follower. Then, the
decision of the leader is analyzed. Finally, we discuss the case of joint investment.
3.1 Follower
Consider the case of the firm that replaces as second (follower). Since the other firm
(leader) has already replaced its production facility, the follower’s replacement decision is not
affected by strategic interactions (the follower chooses its optimal threshold as if the roles of
the firms are preassigned). From (5) and (6) it is obtained that after replacing the asset by








































Subgame perfect equilibrium requires that for ∀s ∈ R
+


























(v;ω) for any s, t, and v such that 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ v < ∞ and v = inf{u|A (u) = A (v)}. A

































i.e. when it equals the probability of Firm i replacing at t (for formal definitions see Fudenberg and Tirole,




is the random stopping time associated with replacing the production facility by the
follower. The first row of (8) is the expected discounted cash flow received until replacement.
At T
F
the follower makes the replacement and from now on produces against a lower marginal
cost k. The expected discounted cash flow after replacement is captured by the second row
of (8).
Let us consider the value of the follower before its own replacement and after replace-
ment of the competitor. In investment problems of this type (cf. Dixit and Pindyck, 1996) a
threshold value of A exists at which the firm is indifferent between investing and refraining
from investment. Consequently, the value of the firm is maximized when replacement of the
production facility takes place as soon as A exceeds this threshold value. Using standard
























Solving the differential equation (9) subject to the condition that V (A) does not explode in
the neighborhood of zero gives




















PV of expected cash flow
, (10)





β (β − 1) + αβ − r = 0, (11)
and
 ≡ r− 2α− σ
2
, (12)
δ ≡ r− α. (13)
From (10) it can be seen that there are two components contributing to the value of the firm.
The first component corresponds to the value of the flexibility to replace the production
facility. The remainder of the RHS of (10) reflects the present value of the expected cash
flow given that the firm produces with the existing technology forever. Parameters δ and 
can be interpreted as the effective discount rates corresponding to the quadratic and linear
component of the profit function, respectively.
10
Consequently, a finite valuation is obtained
if and only if the condition r − 2α− σ
2
> 0 is satisfied.
11
10
See Dixit (1993), p. 13-14, for the discusion on the discounting of different powers of the geometric
Brownian motion.
11
In order to assess how restrictive the condition r − 2α − σ
2
> 0 is, we calculate the maximum feasible
growth rate of demand using the parameters of a representative US Standard and Poor’s 500 firm (using
8
To derive the optimal replacement threshold we apply the value-matching and smooth-
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The optimal time of replacement made by the follower is denoted by
T
F
= inf{t|A (t) ≥ A
F
}. (17)
Note that the optimal threshold (16) increases with uncertainty (through β), and decreases
with the growth rate of demand (through β and δ). The value of the follower can now be




































































Having established the optimal replacement rule of the follower, we are ready to de-
termine the payoff of the firm that invests as the leader. The value function of the leader,
historical CRSP data from 1926-99, as reported in Bodie et al., 2002). By applying Itoˆ’s lemma one can
show that the volatility of the process proportional to the square of the original process equals two times the
volatility of the original process. Hence, since the value of the firm is proportional to A
2
, its instantaneous
volatility equals twice the volatility of A. As a consequence, for a standard deviation of 20.2%, which is typical
for the representative S&P 500 firm, the implied σ equals 10.1%. Given that the average yield on long-term
treasury bonds amounts in the relevant period to 5.36%, finite valuations are ensured for values of parameter





/2 = 2.17%. This corresponds to the 4.39% (1.0217
2
− 1)
growth of demand measured as the consumers’ valuations integrated over the mass of consumers.
12
The value matching condition equalizes the value of the firm before the replacement (including the replace-
ment option), as in (10), and the value after the replacement net of the associated sunk cost. Upon observing















, condition (14) is obtained. Condition (15) is obtained by taking the derivatives of (14)
with respect to A.
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The first two components of (19) correspond to the present value of the leader’s profits
realized until the moment of the follower’s investment, net of the leader’s sunk cost. The
second integral corresponds to the discounted perpetual stream of profits obtained after the
investment of the follower.
Analogous to expression (18) of the follower problem, we can express the value of



































































The first row of (20) corresponds to the net present value of the leader profits without the
follower ever replacing its asset. The second row reflects the present value of future profits
lost due to the follower’s replacement at A
F
. This loss is caused by the fact that after the
follower has invested, the follower can produce in a cheaper way, which makes it a stronger
competitor for a leader. Consequently, the value of the leader is positively related to A
F
.
The last row represents the net present value of profits in a situation where it is optimal for
the follower to invest immediately.
3.3 Simultaneous Investment
It is possible that the firms decide to invest simultaneously. The time-t value function
































































Expression (21) can be interpreted analogous to (8) and (19). Consequently, the value of





































































The last row equals the value of the firm when the simultaneous investment is made imme-




Since both firms are ex ante identical, it is natural to consider symmetric replacement
strategies and assume the firms’ roles being endogenous, i.e. that it is not determined before-
hand which firm will be the first to replace. There are two types of equilibria that can occur
under this choice of strategies. We start by presenting the preemptive equilibrium, which is
followed by a description of the simultaneous equilibrium.
4.1 Preemptive Equilibrium
The first type of equilibrium is a preemptive equilibrium where Firm i is the leader and
Firm j is the follower. Let us define A
P
to be the root of










. Assume for the moment that A (0) < A
P







the payoff of the leader is higher than the payoff of the follower, each firm will







. In the search
for an equilibrium we reason backwards in terms of the values of A (note that equation (2)








. Then it holds that the leader’s payoff is higher than the payoff of the follower.
This implies that (without loss of generality) Firm i has an incentive to be the first investor
there. Firm j anticipates this and would invest at A−ε. Repeating this reasoning we reach an
equilibrium in which Firm i invests at A
P
and Firm j waits with replacement until demand
equals A
F
. Note that if both firms invest at A
P





). At A = A
P
simultaneous replacement is not profitable because demand
is insufficient. Figure 1 depicts the payoffs (relative to the follower payoff) associated with
the preemptive equilibrium.
Since the firms are identical it is not clear beforehand which of them will be the



















Figure 1: The values of the leader, V
L
, optimal simultaneous replacement, V
S
, and early simultane-
ous replacement, V
J
, relative to the value function of the follower, V
F
, for a set of parameter values





of the firms are determined. Later, we discuss how the roles of the firms can be determined
in real-life situations.
In order to formalize the analysis of how the roles of the firms are determined, we
adopt the approach of Thijssen et al. (2002). This approach extends the perfect equilibrium
concept of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) to stochastic games. As in Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985), the firms use mixed strategies in which the expected payoff is equal to the payoff
of the follower (recall that the firms are risk-neutral). It is argued there (see also Torvund,
1999) that in continuous-time preemption games a closed loop strategy of Firm i consists of a






(t) is the probability that Firm i has invested
by time t. The function p
i
(t) is the measure of the intensity of atoms in the interval [t, t+ dt] .
It can be interpreted as the probability of playing the first row and the first column (for Firm
1 and Firm 2, respectively) in the following 2 × 2 game: {{replace, replace}, {replace, don’t
replace}, {don’t replace, replace}, {don’t replace, don’t replace}}. Playing this game costs no
time and the game is repeated until at least one firm invests.



















































Since Firm i replaces its asset with probability p
i






















) nothing happens and the game is repeated. After writing down the















































































1 if A (t) ≥ A
F
(29)




























, the probability that one of the firms invests at time t
equals




while the firms invest simultaneously with probability




If A (0) < A
P
, the leader payoff curve lies below the follower curve which implies that it is
optimal for both firms to refrain from investment. At A = A
P
, the leader and the follower
values are equal. This implies that (28) and (31) yield the probability of being the leader
(or follower) equal to
1
2
. The probability of simultaneous investment at A = A
P
is therefore
equal to zero. The leader invests at the moment that A = A
P





(A), and the follower waits until A
F
is reached.
If the stochastic process starts at A (0) ≥ A
P
, at least one of the firms invests






(cf. (32)). In this case, according to (28), p (0) > 0 since the payoff of
the leader exceeds the payoff of the follower. This makes the probability of investing jointly,
and ending up with a low payoff of V
J
(A (0)), become positive.
13
In order to be able to translate the derived mixed strategies into applicable decision
rules (since ”real-world decision makers do not flip coins”), we refer to the approach of
Harsanyi (1973). He has shown that a mixed-strategy equilibrium of a complete information
game, such as the one analyzed in this paper, can be interpreted as the limit of a pure-strategy
equilibrium of a slightly perturbed game of incomplete information (see also Tirole, 1988).
13
Consequently, instead of assuming that firms play mixed strategies in the described above
2× 2 game, one can assume that the actual payoff resulting from becoming the leader equals
V
L





, θ < 0 < θ.
14
The firm observes its own realization of θ but not the one of its
competitor. Now, it can be shown that a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies
exists. There is a critical value of θ = θ
∗
such that the optimal strategy for Firm i is to invest




. Consequently, the firms do not have to invoke randomizing devices in
the implementation of optimal actions.
15
4.2 Simultaneous Equilibrium
The other type of outcome that can occur in the analyzed real option game is the
simultaneous replacement equilibrium. In such a case, both firms replace their production
facilities at T
S
(see (22)). A graphical illustration of the simultaneous equilibrium is depicted
in Figure 2. From this figure it can be concluded that no firm has an incentive to deviate
from this equilibrium since the payoff of this strategy exceeds all other payoffs.
16
The occurrence of a particular type of equilibrium is determined by the relative













i.e. when for some A it is more profitable to become the leader than to replace produc-
13
For sufficient conditions on the payoff functions and information structure when such an interpretation is
possible, see Milgrom and Weber (1986).
14
Here, the uncertainty about the value of parameter θ is just a reduced form representation of uncertainty
about the value of (the one of) the firm-specific primitive parameters of the model, such as a unit production
cost, replacement cost or demand elasticity.
15
An interesting example of a practical solution to the coordination problem is presented in Hoppe and
Lehmann-Grube (2001) in a context of computer fairs: ”If both firms plan to make an announcement at the
same fair, one firm happens to have its press conference before the other with probability 1/2. The other firm
observes the announcement of the first firm, and may decide to postpone its introduction date to a later fair”.
16
Of course, the payoffs resulting from the preemptive equilibrium in Section 4.1 may be lower than those
associated with the optimal joint replacement. However, the occurrence of the preemptive equilibrium, as in
Section 4.1, is due to the fact that values of A exist that the corresponding leader payoff exceeds the value
from the joint replacement strategy. It is the lack of coordination among the firms (with possible transfer of
excess value) that leads to ex post Pareto-inefficient outcomes. In the case of the simultaneous equilibrium
the payoff of the leader never exceeds the payoff from optimal joint replacement and therefore the preemptive



















Figure 2: The values of the leader, V
L
, optimal simultaneous replacement, V
S
, and early simultane-
ous replacement, V
J
, relative to the value function of the follower, V
F
, for a set of parameter values
resulting in the optimality of a simultaneous replacement at A
S
.
tion facilities simultaneously. Otherwise, simultaneous replacement is the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium. In the latter case, the strategy of Firm i can be formalized as
p (t) =
{
0 if A (t) < A
S
,







0 if A (t) < A
S
,




The following proposition implies that firms replace their production facilities simultaneously
if the investment cost is sufficiently high.
Proposition 1 A unique I
∗
exists such that ∀I > I
∗
simultaneous replacement is the
Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
For a sufficiently low replacement cost, i.e. for I < I
∗
, it is optimal for any firm to
replace its production technology and to become the leader even at the very early stage of
the market development. In this case, gaining a (temporary) first-mover advantage justifies
an earlier capital spending. In the opposite situation, i.e. when replacement cost exceeds I
∗
,
firms are better off by utilizing the existing production facility. In that case it is optimal to
15
wait with replacement until market significantly improves, even at the cost of foregoing the
superior first-mover payoff.
Proposition 1 is an important result with respect to the comparison between the real
option exercise game with profit uncertainty and the situation where the firms face product
market uncertainty. In the first case the occurrence of either of the equilibria does not depend
on the irreversible cost associated with the investment decision (see Huisman and Kort, 1999).
This results from the fact that the optimal threshold under profit uncertainty is proportional
to the investment cost I. This proportionality is a consequence of the multiplicative way in
which uncertainty enters the profit function. Conversely, introducing market uncertainty in
a Cournot model results in the optimal threshold being no longer proportional to I. This is
the reason why the resulting equilibrium regions depend on the sunk cost.
17
It is worth pointing out that Proposition 1 does not imply that firms simultaneously
replace their assets only if the replacement cost is sufficiently high. First, consider a reduction






) such that A
P
(1)







threshold corresponding to the cost I
k
. Such a reduction introduces a positive probability of
joint replacement in the preemptive equilibrium (cf. equations (28) and (32)). Moreover, a
further decrease in the replacement cost results eventually in A (0) being located to the right









Figure 1). This results in simultaneous investment occurring at A
S
. Eventually, a further
decrease makes the replacement cost so low that all the thresholds, including A
S
, lie below
A (0) . In such a case firms replace their assets simultaneously at t = 0 and the outcomes of
the preemptive and simultaneous equilibria coincide.
5 Uncertainty and Asset Replacement Thresholds
Since the firms’ decisions to replace production assets are irreversible (sunk cost I cannot
be recovered) and they have the possibility of postponing the replacement, they replace their
production assets later than a simple NPV rule would indicate. In a non-strategic framework,
there exists an option value of waiting for better (but never complete) information which is
taken into account before committing the corporate resources. As uncertainty about the
demand grows, the firm is going to wait with replacement for a higher level of demand, as the
classical real option theory suggests. However, it also has to take into account the interactions
in the product market, that may substantially reduce the value of the timing flexibility.
Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) obtained in a two-period model that these interactions may in
fact result in a negative relationship between the required level of demand at which resources
are committed and uncertainty. In this section, we examine how uncertainty influences the
17
In general, the investment cost affects the boundaries of the equilibrium regions. Therefore, the lack of
such a relationship in a profit uncertainty model is rather a coincidence than a rule.
16
level of demand triggering investment in our continuous-time model.
First, we investigate the impact of volatility on the optimal asset replacement thresh-
olds of the follower and of optimal simultaneous replacement. In these cases the optimal
threshold, A
opt






f(I,K, k, r, α). (36)
















so that the optimal replacement thresholds of the follower and of optimal simultaneous re-
placement increase in uncertainty. In the case of the follower’s decision, the competitor has
already replaced its asset. Hence, what is left to do for the remaining firm is to choose the
optimal replacement timing. Since the opponent has already taken its decision, strategic
interactions do not play a role here. So, as in standard real option theory, also here the
threshold goes up with uncertainty, which reflects the value of waiting argument. In deter-
mining the optimal simultaneous replacement timing strategic interactions do not play a role
either. Therefore, analogous to the follower’s case, the value of waiting argument also prevails
here.
The impact of volatility on the production facility replacement threshold of the leader
requires an additional analysis. We set the marginal cost k to zero to simplify the notation.
18








root of ξ (A) = 0. To determine the effect of market uncertainty on A
P
, we calculate the
derivative of ξ (A) with respect to σ
2
. The change of (25) resulting from a marginal increase
in σ
2









































directly measures the influence of uncertainty on ξ (A), thus on the











reflects the impact on the net
benefit of being the leader of the fact that the follower replacement threshold increases with
uncertainty.
18
An additional motivation for this simplification is provided by the fact that for the majority of intangi-
ble/information products the marginal cost of a unit of good/service is negligible (cf. Shapiro and Varian,
1998).
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At first sight, the joint impact of both effects is ambiguous. (39) represents the simple value
of waiting argument: if uncertainty is large, it is more valuable to wait for new information
before replacing the existing production facility (cf. Dixit and Pindyck, 1996). As we have
just seen, this also holds for the follower. The implication for the leader of the follower
replacing later is that the leader has a cost advantage for a longer time. This makes an
earlier replacement of the leader potentially more beneficial. This effect is captured by (40),
which can thus be interpreted as an increment in the strategic value of becoming the leader
vs. the follower resulting from the delay in the follower’s implementation of the superior
technology. Obviously, the latter effect is not present in monopolistic/perfectly competitive
markets, where the impact of uncertainty is unambiguous.
It is possible to show that the direct effect captured by (39) dominates, irrespective
of the values of the input parameters.
Proposition 2 When uncertainty in the product market increases, the threshold value of
the demand at which the leader replaces its production facility increases too.
Proof. See Appendix A.
From Proposition 2 it can be concluded that the leader threshold responds to volatil-
ity in a qualitatively similar way as a non-strategic threshold, i.e. it increases with uncertainty.
The reason for this result is the following. First, in our model we introduced the possibility
of postponing the replacement of the production facility. Increased uncertainty raises the
profitability of replacement (because the follower replaces later) but, however, the value of
the option to wait rises even more. Second, uncertainty could be beneficial for earlier replace-
ment because of the convex shape of the net gain function, resulting in a power option-like
type of payoff (cf. Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998). Then, while performing a mean preserving
spread, downside losses are more than compensated by upside gains. However, unlike the
two-period framework of Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998), in our continuous-time model the net
gain function is always linear in the stochastic variable A. If the leader invests, the profit
flow pi
00
is replaced by the profit flow pi
10













). To see whether the convexity argument could also work
here, in Section 6 we consider the decision to start production. In this case the firms are not
active initially and can start up production only upon investing. Consequently, the net gain




, respectively, are convex in
A.
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6 Decision to Start Production
Consider two firms having the possibility to start production in a new market where
there is no incumbent. The new market assumption implies, in contrast with Sections 3-4,
that the firms can only start realizing profits after incurring a sunk cost I. It still holds that
demand follows the stochastic process (2). Again, the marginal cost of a unit of output after
starting production, k, is assumed to equal zero.
First, we calculate the value of the demand parameter for which it is optimal for the















The optimal follower threshold (41) exists only for σ
2
< r−2α. For a relatively high degree of
uncertainty, i.e. for σ
2
≥ r−2α (which corresponds to β ∈ (1, 2]), the follower will never start
production since for such levels of uncertainty the value of the option to invest always exceeds












(3r− 4α) I (43)
(for a derivation see Appendix B). Equation (43) corresponds to the maximal value of A
FN
provided that it is finite. In case information about the uncertainty level is imperfect, the
investment problem is solved by first calculating the uncertainty implied by the threshold
A
FN
. Subsequently, the decision maker can decide whether the true level of uncertainty is
more likely to lie below or above the implied value. In the latter case, he should refrain from
entering the market.
Now, let t be the moment at which the leader starts producing in the new market.















































































From (44) and (45) it is obtained that indeed the leader and follower values are convex in


























The impact of uncertainty on the threshold of the leader is not straightforward. Similar as in
the model with the firms initially competing in the product market, there are two effects: the

















































Uncertainty affects the magnitude of each of the mentioned effects via parameter β, as in
Section 5, and via the effective discount rate,  (see (12)). The latter contribution results from
the convexity of the profit function, i.e. its proportionality to the square of the underlying
stochastic variable A (see (45)).







calculating the derivative explicitly, the following result is obtained.
Proposition 3 The threshold value of the demand at which the leader starts production
increases in uncertainty.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Analogous to the follower case, there exists a critical level of uncertainty, σ
2
= r − 2α,
above which it is optimal for the leader never to invest. In the limit, where σ
2
→ r− 2α, the





















The conclusion is that also in the case of a new market, uncertainty raises the thresh-
old levels of market demand at which it is optimal for firms to invest. Moreover, the resulting
convexity of the payoff functions not only raises the threshold of the firms but also results in
a subset of parameters for which no replacement is optimal.
20
7 Uncertainty and Replacement Timing
Until now we analyzed the impact of uncertainty and strategic interactions on the optimal
replacement threshold of the firm. Although threshold values and timing have a lot to do
with each other, it cannot be concluded in general that the relation between the two is
monotonic (cf. Sarkar, 2000). After having determined the dependency of threshold values
on uncertainty in Section 5 and 6, in this section we investigate the relationship between
uncertainty, expected timing of replacement and the probability with which the threshold is
reached within a time interval of a given length.


























denotes the optimal replacement threshold as a function of uncertainty. We
note that expectation (49) tends to infinity for σ
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The expected timing of replacement increases in uncertainty due to two effects. First, for any
given threshold, the associated expected first passage time is increasing in uncertainty (cf.
the first component of the RHS of (50)). Second, for a fixed level of uncertainty, an increase
in the optimal investment threshold leads to an increase in the expected time to reach (cf.
second component of RHS of (50)). Based on (50) it can be concluded that whenever the
threshold goes up due to more uncertainty, it also holds that the expected time to replace the
production facility increases.
An alternative approach to measure the impact of uncertainty on the timing of re-
placement is to look at the probability with which the threshold is reached within a time
interval of a given length, say τ . Contrary to the expected first passage time, this approach
does not impose any restrictions on the values of σ. The probabilities of optimal asset re-




For a derivation of the probability distribution of the first passage time see Harrison (1985) for a formal




beyond 2α implies that the probabilities of surviving without reaching the threshold before
a given time do not fall sufficiently fast for longer hitting times (moreover, the probability that the process
will reach the barrier in infinity is still positive). Since the expectation is the sum of the product of the first
passage times and their probabilities, an insufficient decay in the survival probabilities (without reaching the
threshold) results in the divergence of the expectation.
21
For a discussion of the capital budgeting process at the corporate level see Kaplan and Atkinson (1998),
Ch. 14 and Bower (1986), Ch. 1-3.
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The formula for the probability of hitting the optimal replacement threshold before
time τ by a geometric Brownian motion can be derived using, for instance, Harrison (1985,
Equation 8.11). Consequently, it holds that


















































where T denotes the time to reach the threshold and Φ is the standard normal cumulative




have an unambiguous sign and it can thus be shown that, in general, uncertainty can affect
the probability of reaching the threshold within a given time in both directions.
First, we illustrate the relationship between the first passage time, volatility and
related probabilities for the follower threshold since this threshold is unaffected by strategic
considerations. Subsequently, we present results of simulations related to the threshold of
the leader. In this part we use the model of Sections 3-4. The results for the decision to start
production are qualitatively similar and are not reported.
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Figure 3: The cumulative probability of reaching the optimal follower replacement threshold as a
function of demand uncertainty for a set of parameter values: A = 4, r = 0.05, α = 0.015, K = 3,
k = 0 and I = 60.
From Figure 3 it can be concluded that the form of the relationship between the
22
In this case a restriction on σ has to be imposed in order to ensure a positive sign of  (cf. (12)).
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uncertainty and the probability of reaching the threshold depends on the length of the time
interval. For sufficiently long time intervals, the cumulative probability of reaching the thresh-
old decreases in volatility. Intuitively, this can be explained by the fact that the probability
mass of the first passage time density function moves to the right (cf. (50)) and longer
times of reaching the demand level triggering replacement become more likely. Moreover, the
trigger itself is increasing in σ.
For low values of τ the probability of reaching the replacement threshold first in-
creases and then decreases. For σ = 0 the probability of reaching the threshold within a
certain time interval is zero when the optimal replacement time lies outside this interval.
Increasing σ results in a spread of the probability mass, so that the probability of reaching
the demand threshold becomes positive for a strictly positive σ. A larger spread is initially
equivalent to a higher probability of hitting the optimal replacement threshold. However,
when volatility continues to rise, at a certain moment the effect of the probability mass shift-
ing to the right starts to dominate the effect of the spread. As a consequence, the cumulative
probability of reaching the threshold becomes smaller again.














Figure 4: The cumulative probability of reaching the optimal follower replacement threshold as a
function of time horizon for the set of parameter values: A = 4, r = 0.05, α = 0.015, K = 3,
k = 0 and I = 60.
Figure 4 indicates that the probability of reaching the follower threshold always
increases with the time interval, which is of course trivial. The relevant observation is that
this relationship is more pronounced for low levels of market uncertainty. This results from
the fact that in the absence of uncertainty the optimal investment trigger is reached at a
23
specified point in time with probability 1 and the corresponding cumulative density function
is a heaviside step function. Increasing volatility spreads the probability mass around the
point corresponding to the deterministic case. This leads to an increased cumulative chance
of reaching the trigger at points in time situated to the left of this specified point in time,
while the reverse is true for the point situated to the right. This influences the shape of the
cumulative distribution function whose slope decreases in uncertainty.
















































Figure 5: The derivative with respect to market uncertainty of the cumulative probability of reaching
the optimal follower threshold as a function of uncertainty for the set of parameter values: A = 4,
r = 0.05, α = 0.015, K = 3, k = 0 and I = 60.
Figure 5 allows for a closer inspection of the relationship between the timing of
asset replacement and uncertainty. It can be concluded that, irrespective from the length
of the time interval, there exists a level of uncertainty beyond which a further increase in
uncertainty always reduces the probability of the optimal asset replacement. The relationship
between this level and the length of the time interval is inverse, i.e. the longer the time
interval, the lower level of uncertainty for which a further uncertainty increase reduces the
probability of the optimal replacement. For example, using the parameters from Figure 5 we
can conclude that for τ = 5 this critical value of uncertainty, σ, is 0.234, for τ = 10 it is only
0.118, whereas for τ = 20 increased uncertainty always reduces the cumulative probability of
optimal investment.
Figure 6 indicates that the probability of the optimal replacement increases in un-
certainty for a sufficiently short time interval and decreases for a sufficiently long horizon.
Moreover, the derivative of the probability of reaching the optimal threshold changes its sign
24


















































Figure 6: The derivative with respect to market uncertainty of the cumulative probability of reaching
the optimal follower threshold as a function of time horizon for the set of parameter values: A = 4,
r = 0.05, α = 0.015, K = 3, k = 0 and I = 60.
only once. Finally, Figure 6 allows for the conclusion that the length of time interval beyond
which uncertainty negatively affects the probability of optimal replacement is, again, nega-
tively related to the uncertainty level. For σ = 0.1 the interval length which separates the
areas of a positive and a negative relationship equals 11.46 years, for σ = 0.2 it equals 5.87
years, while for σ = 0.3 it drops to 4.06 years.
Despite the presence of strategic effects, the probability of asset replacement of the
leader within a given time interval responds to changes in uncertainty and the length of the
interval in a similar way as the corresponding probabilities of the follower. For low σ’s the
probability of investing increases more rapidly with the length of the time interval than for
high σ’s. Moreover, for high τ ’s the probability of replacing the existing asset is always
decreasing in uncertainty, while for low τ ’s the probability behaves in a non-monotonic way.
The results of the simulations concerning the relationship between uncertainty, first
passage time and probabilities of reaching the leader threshold are presented in Table 1 below.
25
σ τ = 1 τ = 2 τ = 5 τ = 10 τ = 15 τ = 20
0.05 0.06 2.39 24.11 54.32 71.17 80.97
0.10 0.61 5.93 26.79 47.94 59.70 67.24
0.20 0.62 5.14 21.00 36.47 45.10 50.72
0.30 0.46 3.97 16.50 28.66 35.31 39.55
0.40 0.39 3.30 13.57 23.22 28.29 31.39
0.50 0.36 2.93 11.55 19.23 23.02 25.21
Table 1: The cumulative probability (in percentages) of reaching the optimal leader replacement
threshold as a function of demand uncertainty for the set parameter values: A = 2, r = 0.05, α =
0.015, k = 0, K = 3 and I = 60.
The relationship between the investment probability of the leader and uncertainty is
analogous to the corresponding relationship of the follower. The probability that the leader
replaces its production facility within a given time interval decreases with uncertainty when
the length of this interval is sufficiently large. In a situation where the relevant interval
is sufficiently short, there are two contradictory effects. On the one hand, the investment
probability increases because higher volatility enhances the chance of reaching a particular
threshold early. On the other hand, this probability eventually declines with uncertainty
because then the effect of the probability mass shifting to the right begins to dominate.
Now, we formulate the following proposition, which extends Sarkar (2000) by defining
the time interval lengths separating a monotonic and non-monotonic relationship between











, α > 0, (52)
as the point in time at which the replacement threshold A
∗
is reached in the deterministic
case. Then it holds that for τ < τ
∗
the probability of reaching the investment threshold A
∗
before τ increases in uncertainty at a relatively low level of uncertainty and decreases for
a relatively high level, whereas for τ > τ
∗
the probability of reaching the optimal threshold
before τ always decreases in uncertainty.
Proof. See Appendix A.
On the basis of Proposition 4 it may be concluded that the replacement horizon being
equal to the optimal timing of replacement in the deterministic case separates the regions
of monotonic and non-monotonic relationship between uncertainty and the probability of
replacement. In Table 1, the parameters are chosen in such a way that the optimal timing of
replacement in the deterministic case equals τ
∗
= 9.36. Therefore the investment-uncertainty
relationship in columns 2-4 is non-monotonic, while it is negative in columns 5-7.
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In order to determine τ
∗
for the leader, we need to determine its replacement timing
in the deterministic case. It holds that the optimal investment timing of the leader in the
model without uncertainty is equal to the rent equalization point in the preemption game
of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). In the case of the follower, τ
∗
is equal to the point of




, reaches the flow associated
with the replacement cost, Ir. Hence, τ
∗
corresponds to the optimal Jorgensonian trigger,
which equalizes the flow costs and revenues of the project. The optimal simultaneous re-
placement closely resembles the case of the follower trigger. The only difference is that now





Finally, we would like to point out that our analysis also extends to the situation
where α ≤ 0. In such a case and without uncertainty the firms would face now-or-never
decisions. Therefore, it holds that τ
∗
∈ {0,∞}, so that the relationship between the invest-
ment probability within a given time interval and uncertainty will be either non-monotonic
or decreasing for all time horizons. This implies that in mature industries (i.e. those with
non-positive growth rate), the probability of launching existing positive NPV projects always
decreases with uncertainty. As far as initially negative NPV projects are concerned, the
probability of their optimal execution is initially increasing in uncertainty. When uncertainty
becomes sufficiently high, the replacement probability starts to fall.
8 Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the firm’s decision to replace an existing produc-
tion facility with a technologically superior one. In order to capture the effect of strategic
interactions among the firms operating in an imperfectly competitive and uncertain envi-
ronment we model the product market as a Cournot duopoly with a stochastic demand
parameter. Such a formulation results in the payoff functions being convex in the stochastic
demand parameter.
We determine the types of equilibria of the real option game played by the firms. We
show that it is optimal for the firms to replace their production facilities sequentially when
the associated cost is relatively low and simultaneously otherwise.
Furthermore, we find that the direct effect of uncertainty (related to the waiting
option) on the replacement threshold of the leader is always larger than the indirect effect
(strategic option) resulting from the delay in the follower decision to replace its production
facility. Consequently, irrespective from the type of equilibrium, increasing uncertainty always
raises the level of demand triggering the optimal replacement. This result also holds in case
of the decision to start production rather than to replace the existing asset.
Moreover, it can be concluded that the expected timing of replacement increases with
uncertainty. This result supports the view that uncertainty delays the implementation of the
27
new technology, even in the presence of strategic interactions combined with a convex profit
function. Moreover, it shows that the result of Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) that uncertainty
can stimulate investment due to strategic interactions does not carry over from a two period
model to a continuous-time setting.
We also determine the probability of replacing the production facility within a cer-
tain time interval. Here, the point in time at which replacement is made optimally in the
deterministic case plays a crucial role. For an interval that contains this point in time, the
probability of optimal replacement within this time interval decreases with uncertainty. How-
ever, if this time interval is that short that the optimal replacement time in the deterministic
case lies outside this interval, then the replacement probability goes up with uncertainty
when uncertainty is low while it goes down otherwise.
Finally, we would like to discuss the limitations of our approach. In order to en-
sure analytical tractability and to make our results comparable to Kulatilaka and Perotti
(1998), we used a linear demand specification and parallel shifts in demand. Such a model
specification allowed us to show that in a continuous-time framework the convexity of payoff
functions does not result in investment occurring at lower states of demand when uncertainty
is higher, as it does in a two-period model. Our setting enabled us to show that uncertainty
enhancing convex payoffs and therefore stimulating investment in a two-period case does
not accelerate strategic replacement when there is flexibility in timing the replacement. Of
course, our predictions do not automatically carry over to other forms of product market
uncertainty. In other words, we do not formally define the classes of demand functions for
which the analysis holds. With respect to robustness of our results, it is also important to
relax other assumptions like constant marginal costs and Cournot competition. We plan to
pursue these issues in future work.
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A Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. First, let us define





Here, we assume k = 0. After substituting (20) and (24) into (A.1) we get
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for A ≤ A
F




] the minimum of ζ (A)
is smaller than zero, a preemptive equilibrium occurs. Otherwise, the firms replace their
production facilities simultaneously.
24
The existence of a negative minimum of ζ (A) depends



















































The type of equilibrium is uniquely determined by the sign of ζ (A
∗∗
). First, we show that
ζ (A
∗∗
) is increasing in I. Then, to prove the existence of a unique value of I for which
ζ (A
∗∗
) = 0, we establish that ζ (A
∗∗
) is negative for a sufficiently small I and that it is
positive for I tending to infinity.
Consequently, we first show that ζ (A
∗∗









































































Subsequently, we substitute for A in (A.6) the expression (A.3) for A
∗∗
. Complexity of the
resulting expression yields the necessity to use a numerical procedure. A geometric grid
23
The proof for general k goes along the same lines and is skipped for the sake of brevity.
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Strictly speaking, the preemptive equilibrium still exists in this case but is Pareto-dominated by the












is positive for β ∈ [1,
r
α
), and α ∈ (0,∞) , β ∈ [1,∞), and










To conclude that ζ (A
∗∗
) is negative for a sufficiently small I, we use the following
properties of ζ (A): i) ζ (A
∗∗























(cf. footnote 22). Property i) follows from the definition of A
∗∗
. Property ii) can be


































and that the expression between brackets is negative for β ∈ (1,∞).





















by observing that the expression between brackets is positive for β ∈ (1,∞).



















































is the smallest root of the concave




















to conclude that the replacement threshold of the leader is increasing with uncertainty (de-
creasing with β). Moreover, upon analyzing (A.7) we know that
dξ(A)
dβ
changes its sign only
















































> 0. In order to prove
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An analytical proof is again not possible but numerically it can be shown that ξ (A
∗
) is positive
for β ∈ [1,
r
α
), and α ∈ (0,∞) , β ∈ [1,∞), and α ∈ (−∞, 0], and for other parameters falling
























































Denote the smallest solution of ξ
N




cannot be explicitly derived,
we proceed as follows. First, we consider a particular point A > A
PN





















> 0, which would imply that A > A
PN
. After substituting (A.14)
























φ (β) . (A.15)




positive. Therefore we are interested only in the sign of φ (β) . For β ↓ 2 we obtain that
lim
β↓2
φ (β) = 0. (A.16)





























is positive so that A > A
PN
. We proceed with prov-













































































































































that is different from zero. This







is negative at most in only one














(β − 2) 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is negative for β ∈ [1,
r
α
), and α ∈ (0,∞) ,
β ∈ [1,∞), and α ∈ (−∞, 0], α ∈ R, r ∈ (α,∞) and I ∈ (0,∞). Therefore the only remaining
part of the proof is to show that A < A
PN
for any vector of input parameters. Since the
explicit analytical forms of A and A
PN
do not exist, we use a numerical procedure. Using a
grid search technique (for the domains of input parameters as in the proofs of Propositions
3.1 and 3.2), we calculate the differences A
PN
− A and it turns out that they are always
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> 0, i.e. the investment threshold of the leader increases with uncertainty.
Proof of Proposition 4. First, we show that τ
∗
is the time to reach the replacement
threshold A
∗
in the deterministic case. After observing that x = αt is the solution to dx = αdt
















in (52) is the time to reach the threshold A
∗
. Now, we consider the density function
ϕ
(
τ ;µ (σ) , σ
2
)
being the density function of the first passage time for a geometric Brownian
motion, which has a mean µ (σ) and variance σ
2
. For the moment we assume that µ =
τ
∗
irrespective from σ. Then, raising the variance σ
2
is equivalent to performing a mean











) ≤ 0, (A.26)
with equality holding if and only if τ = τ
∗
. The expectation of the first passage time, E [τ ],
associated with hitting the replacement threshold A
∗
, is increasing with σ (cf. (50)) and
A
∗
is increasing with σ, too. For τ > τ
∗
, an increase in uncertainty not only reduces the
probability mass to the left of τ via the mean preserving spread but also because of the
mean itself moving to the right. Therefore the effect of uncertainty on the probability of the
replacement decision is unambiguous in this region and negative. For σ →∞ the probability































































































P (T < τ) = 0. (A.29)
We will show later that (A.29) holds for all relevant thresholds.
For τ < τ
∗
, the two effects work in opposite directions. As in the previous case, the
mean E [τ ] is increasing with uncertainty. Without a change in the volatility, an increase in
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the mean would then decrease the probability of replacing the existing production facility.
However, increasing uncertainty results in a greater probability mass being present in the left
tail of ϕ (τ). Therefore, the total effect of increasing uncertainty is ambiguous in this region.
However, we are able to conclude that the probability of investing at a given τ behaves in a
certain non-monotonic way. For σ = 0, there is no probability mass on the interval [0, τ
∗
),
since the investment takes place at τ < τ
∗
with probability 1. Therefore an increase in
uncertainty initially leads to an increased probability of investment. For relatively large σ
the effect of moving the mean of the distribution to the right starts to dominate and the
probability of asset replacement falls. For σ → ∞ the probability of replacing the existing
asset before a given time τ decreases to zero.
Finally, we show that all the thresholds increase with uncertainty monotonically
and unboundedly. We already know (from Sections 5 and 6) that the optimal replacement
thresholds increase with uncertainty monotonically. So now we only have to prove that the
thresholds grow in uncertainty unboundedly. For the thresholds of the follower and in case
of simultaneous replacement it is easy to observe that
β
β−1
tends to infinity when σ →∞.
27
The replacement threshold of the leader requires slightly more attention.
28
We already know
that the leader replaces its asset as soon as the stochastic variable reaches the smallest root
















































































































































For a new market model a similar conclusion can be drawn after the substitution of parameters in the
original geometric Brownian motion.
28
The unboundedness of the leader threshold in the new market entry can be proven in a similar way as in




























































the LHS of (A.32) approaches zero from above. To shorten the notation we rewrite (A.31)
into
0 =M (A)A−N. (A.34)
Now, we are looking for the solution of (A.34). From (A.33) it can be seen that m (A) is
tending to zero from above ∀A ∈ R
++
when uncertainty is increasing. Consequently, any






which completes the proof.
B Limiting values of optimal thresholds to start production









































































































Applying l’Hôpital’s rule yields


































































+ 2r (r − 2α)− α+
1
2
(r − 2α) + 2r
=





















(r − 2α) + 2r
.
Since 2α < r, this is equal to

















(r − 2α) + 2r
=








= 3r − 4α. (B.2)
Substituting (B.2) into (B.1) yields the desired result.
Limiting value of the optimal leader threshold . To obtain the leader’s limiting

































































9 (3r − 4α) I



































9 (3r − 4α) I
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